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Methodological Solipsism Reconsidered:
 
Is There Anybody Out There?
 
Peter Asaro 
In his paper "Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research 
Strategy in Cognitive Psychology," Jerry Fodor distinguishes the 
Computational Theory of Mind as a stronger version of the 
Representational Theory of Mind. He goes on to argue that a Naturalistic 
Psychology which considers organism environment relations is impossible 
and unproductive. He concludes that only a computational view of the 
mind is relevant and therefore the task of psychology should be 
limited to a methodological solipsism. While I agree with most of 
Fodor's argumentation, he makes one mistake which causes him to miss an 
alternative. I argue that pure methodological solipsism, done to the 
exclusion of any content, would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. 
I propose a more moderate view of computational psychology which 
incorporates some of the intuitions of a semantic psychology, while still 
maintaining the conditions put forth by Fodor. 
In drawing the distinction between the computational and 
representational theories of mind, Fodor develops what he calls the 
formality condition. Fodor describes the representational theory of mind 
as the broad view that organisms create mental representations and 
that propositional attitudes are the relations that organisms bear to these 
mental representations. The computational theory of mind is the 
narrower view that these representations are purely symbolic and formal­
syntactic in nature. According to the representational theory, mental states 
can be distinguished by the content of the relevant mental representations 
and the relation that the subject bears to those representations (Le. 
thinking, doubting, believing). It is the claim that mental processes are 
purely syntactic that makes the computational theory stronger than the 
representational theory. Simply stated, the formality condition is the 
notion that the formal aspects of thoughts are all that is essential to type 
distinguishing thoughts. Fodor construes formal to mean the precise 
opposite of semantic; syntactic is an imprecise opposite since it cannot 
apply to all cases, such as rotating an object. 
What makes syntactic operations a species of formal operations is 
that being syntactic is a way of not being semantic. Formal 
operations are the ones that are specified without reference to such 
semantic properties as, for example, truth, reference and meaning. 
(309) 
With his new-found formality condition in hand, Fodor then 
reexamines the controversy between Rational Psychology and 
Naturalism. Rational psychology, embraced by Rationalist and 
Empiricist alike, holds an introspectionist construal of type individuating 
mental states. That is, mental states are type identical if and only if 
they are introspectively indistinguishable, and since introspection 
cannot distinguish perception from hallucination, or knowledge from 
. ' ..........
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belief, one's mental states might be as they are even if the world were 
radically different. Naturalism sees psychology as a branch of biology, 
and holds that one must see the organism as embedded in a physical 
environment. Naturalism is behavioristic in that it seeks to trace the 
organism/environment interactions which govern behavior. Fodor argues 
that the computational theory of mind shifts the debate from 
introspectionism vs. behaviorism and aids both sides. 
If we embrace the computational theory of mind, it is easy to 
think of the mindlbrain as a kind of computer. It has memory, capacities 
for scanning and altering its memory, and transducers of information 
from the outside world ("oracles" as Fodor calls them) which are roughly 
analogous to senses. Thus construed, the significance of "environmental 
information upon [mental] processes is exhausted by the formal character 
of whatever the oracles write [to the memory]"(314). Whether the 
information is true or not is insignificant: the oracles could be writing 
accurately about the environment or could be inputs for the typewriter of 
a Cartesian demon. He thereby arrives at his methodological solipsism. 
I'm saying, in effect, that the formality condition, viewed in this 
context, is tantamount to a sort of methodological solipsism. If 
mental processes are formal, they have access only to the formal 
properties of such representations of the environment as the senses 
provide. Hence, they have no access to the semantic properties of 
such representations, including the property of being true, of 
having referents, or, indeed the property of being representations 
of the environment. (314) 
The consequence of methodological solipsism is that 
researchers need not consider the semantic aspects of thought, which are 
taken to be misleading and fruitless. Examples are useful here. Take the 
computer program SHRDLU, developed by Terry Winograd. SHRDLU 
takes commands and accepts descriptions of a simple "block world". It 
can 'manipulate' geometric objects in its virtual world and issue 
'perceptual' reports on the state of this virtual world, and of previous states 
from memory. All of the information it receives is false. It lives in a 
completely notional world, deceived by its inputs. All of SHRDLU's 
beliefs are false. It is effectively an organism being deceived by a 
malignant demon, a Cartesian nightmare. All that is necessary for a psy­
chology of SHRDLU is its formal properties: this is methodological 
solipsism. Trying to do any other kind of psychology on SHRDLU, 
one which sought to find what made its statements about the "block 
world" true or the referents of SHRDLU's statements, would miss the 
point of why SHRDLU acts and elieves the way that it does. 
Fodor then tries to defend definitively his requirement that any 
psychology must honor the formality condition and therefore 
methodological solipsism. To do this, he uses the distinction between 
opaque and transparent construals of meaning. Fodor argues that "when 
we articulate the generalizations in virtue of which behavior is contingent 
upon mental states, it is typically an opaque construal of the mental state 
attributions which does the work" (317). By such a construal, the belief 
that the Evening Star rises in the East is type distinct from the belief that 
the Morning Star does, whereas by a transparent construal these beliefs 
would be type identical because t 
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l transparent construal these beliefs 
would be type identical because they are coreferential. The belief about 
the Evening Star is formally distinct from the belief about the Morning 
Star: these beliefs must be distinct, since they result in different behaviors 
(an individual having a belief about the Evening Star could believe 
something quite different about the Morning Star). The only reason for 
saying they are type identical is that they are coreferential-- but reference 
is a semantic quality can not adhere to the formality condition. Thus only 
a fully opaque construal of beliefs respects the formality condition. 
And where does all this get us? According to Fodor, it is possible that 
"the formality condition can be honored by a theory which taxonomizes 
mental states by their content." He explains, "it's because different content 
implies formally distinct internal representations and formally distinct 
internal representations can be functionally different-- can differ in their 
causal role" (324). In fact, this is the basic idea of modern cognitive 
psychology: to connect computation and content and thereby use the 
intensional properties of mental states to explain their causal properties. 
Yet Fodor pursues his intuition that mental states can only have access to 
the formal properties, and that "the contrary view [that is, any view which 
incorporates meaning, content or reference--the semantic properties] is 
not only empirically fruitless but also conceptually unsound."(325) 
Having satisfied all of his intuitions regarding the computational 
theory, the formality condition, methodological solipsism, and rational 
psychology, he moves on to consider the possibility of natur!l1istic 
psychology. While he cannot argue against it theoretically, for it "seems 
very reasonable," he argues that it will be impossible to realize. First, he 
contends that the goal of a naturalistic psychology would be to 
"specify environmental objects in a vocabulary such that 
environment/organism relations are law-instantiating when so 
described" (334). But this necessarily requires that the vocabulary be 
"scientifically accurate". This is motivated by the Twin Earth examples of 
Putnam. He then invokes an argument from Bloomfield: 
(a) We don't know relevant nomologically necessary properties of 
most of the things we can think about and 
(b) it isn't the psychologists' job to find them out (334). 
In fact, it is the physicists' job. In order to have a naturalistic psychology, 
we would have to wait for the completion of physics in order to know any 
of the terms of the objects we think about. Fodor doesn't believe that 
naturalism is necessarily wrong; he just thinks that it will take at least 
another 300 years of science before it can start. 
Fodor then attacks the research strategies of the naturalists. The 
naturalists are very consistent and forcefully entrenched in their 
philosophy. But when it comes to actually doing their research, however, 
they completely ignore everything they have said. They have to ignore it: 
there just aren't any words in our language which are defined precisely 
enough to use in a naturalistic psychology. In reality they just fudge, 
saying that a term refers to 'just what it refers to'. They claim to look at 
the relations and interactions that result from the reference but fail to 
understand the precise nature of the referent. Fodor argues that because 
of this fudging, naturalism will never succeed. 
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Fodor concludes by saying that there are only two options in 
psychology. First, we could just fudge and try to do naturalism. Or 
second, we could try a computational psychology in which mental states 
are type individuated opaquely. But he has missed an alternative. Fodor 
doesn't argue that there is no naturalistic psychology: it's just not 
something we are capable of pursuing. Fodor also doesn't argue that there 
are no semantic qualities. He just contends that we don't really know what 
they all are, have no way of figuring them out, and don't really need them 
to do computational psychology anyway. Fodor chooses computa­
tionalism as a research strategy because it is productive, though only by 
default, and has a practical hope of succeeding when "for 
methodology, practical hope is everything."(337) 
I argue that Fodor has missed the best alternative. I will first show 
how difficult a purely formal computational psychology will really be. 
I will then propose my own version of computational psychology, a 
weak computationalism, and show why it would work better, and how it 
could satisfy the opacity condition without being purely formal. 
I maintain that conducting a computational psychology which 
attempts to type individuate our mental states in a purely formal manner 
will be virtually impossible. A computer analogy is in order. What better 
way to test computational theory? 
In computer science, the programs that actually control the computer 
are written in assembly code, also know as machine code, essentially a 
very cryptic binary language. The problem is that it is incredibly difficult 
and tedious to write even simple programs in assembly, because its ones 
and zeros don't mean much to even a skilled programmer. Programmers 
have therefore created high level programming languages and compilers, 
such as C and Pascal, which use English-based commands which make 
sense to a skilled programmer. The compiler then translates the high­
level language into assembly code, since this is the only language the 
computer can really "speak". What computational psychology requires is 
to look at only the "machine code of the brain", if such a thing even 
exists. But the most difficult task in all of programming language 
research is reverse compiling, turning the compiled machine code back 
into an intelligible program. Reverse compiling is done only rarely, and 
usually only done for viruses: when it is necessary to know what the virus 
does in order to protect the system, yet there is only the compiled version 
of the program available. What makes it so very difficult is that assembly 
code is purely formal, free of any content: if it had content, they wouldn't 
need to reverse compile it. Assembly code just doesn't mean anything 
to a programmer, and it was at least developed by humans. 
Will the computational psychologist be any better off than the reverse 
compilers? I contend that they will be far worse off. Computational 
psychologists don't even have an "assembly code" for the brain yet (there 
may not even be one), plus the fact that the brain is massively parallel and 
thousands of times as compl~x as any computer, and the certainty that the 
mind's "program" will be unimaginably complex. This all adds up to an 
impossible task for the strong computational psychologists. How can 
computational psychology work? 
Fodor makes one fatal error in his argumentation. Fodor lumps 
content together with truth and reference as a semantic quality, and throws 
out semantic qualities as being transparent. Content would seem prima 
41 
facie to be a transparent semantic 
consequence of reference or "abol 
external, and Fodor accepts this aJ 
Fodor's primary concern 
psychology. But Fodor 
nontransparency isn't quite the sa. 
clear that transparently coexten 
distinct, according to Fodor, 
there are nevertheless SOD 
identification. In particula 
(a) there are some cases 01 
thoughts which count as I 
hence as identical in contf 
contents); and 
(b) non-coextensive thou 
differ in content at least 
(320). 
Thankfully, Fodor gives example 
show why he is wrong. Cases of 
(opaquely) type identical, yet fc 
(b) involve what he thinks are for 
which characterize opaquely disti 
(a) I think I'm sick and 
through your head is 'I'm ­
is 'he's sick'. (b) Sam 
Then what's running throu 
Misha feels faint and Alfn: 
through Alfred's head, too, 
These are the obvious results c 
assumption that the only way to : 
extension, and a confusion betweel 
though it. He addresses the latter : 
One might try saying 
individuation is what's h 
through it. So, for exam) 
thinking, 'he feels 
counterfactuals are true 01 
as: 'he, Sam,'whereas AI: 
Misha.' The problem ',; 
counterfactuals are releva 
going to tum out that there 
isms having type identical 
Fodor is wrong to ignore the cour 
to explain behavior, it is importan 
the subject, at least as it relates to 4
Undergraduate Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/rev/vol6/iss1/7
17 16 
Itat there are only two options in 
ldge and try to do naturalism. Or 
psychology in which mental states 
Ie has missed an alternative. Fodor 
rralistic psychology: it's just not 
, Fodor also doesn't argue that there 
ends that we don't really know what 
lem out, and don't really need them 
lyway. Fodor chooses computa­
;e it is productive, though only by 
lpe of succeeding when "for 
ling."(337) 
e best alternative. I will first show 
Iltional psychology will really be. 
,on of computational psychology, a 
ly it would work better, and how it 
bout being purely formal. 
computational psychology which 
at states in a purely formal manner 
Iter analogy is in order. What better 
) that actually control the computer 
lOW as machine code, essentially a 
blem is that it is incredibly difficult 
:rams in assembly, because its ones 
skilled programmer. Programmers 
tramming languages and compilers, 
~lisb-based commands which make 
compiler then translates the high­
~ince this is the only language the 
lmputational psychology requires is 
If the brain", if such a thing even 
in all of programming language 
~ the compiled machine code back 
compiling is done only rarely, and 
is necessary to know what the virus 
:t there is only the compiled version 
i it so very difficult is that assembly 
tent: if it had content, they wouldn't 
ly code just doesn't mean anything 
~veloped by humans. 
ist be any better off than the reverse 
I be far worse off. Computational 
~mbly code" for the brain yet (there 
It the brain is massively parallel and 
computer, and the certainty that the 
ly complex. This all adds up to an 
Itational psychologists. How can 
1 his argumentation. Fodor lumps 
ce as a semantic quality, and throws 
>arent. Content would seem prima 
facie to be a transparent semantic quality: it is commonly construed as a 
consequence of reference or "aboutness." Many may argue that content is 
external, and Fodor accepts this after some misguided consideration. 
Fodor's primary concern is maintaining nontransparency in 
psychology. But Fodor believes, "The trouble is that 
nontransparency isn't quite the same notion as opacity."(320) While it is 
clear that transparently coextensional beliefs may be opaquely type 
distinct, according to Fodor, 
there are nevertheless some semantic conditions on opaque type 
identification. In particular: 
(a) there are some cases of formally distinct but coextensive token 
thoughts which count as tokens of the same (opaque) type (and 
hence as identical in content at least on one way of individuating 
contents); and 
(b) non-coextensive thoughts are ipso facto type distinct (and 
differ in content at least on one way of individuating contents) 
(320). 
Thankfully, Fodor gives examples to explain these conditions so I can 
show why he is wrong. Cases of type (a) consist of what he thinks are 
(opaquely) type identical, yet formally distinct thoughts. Cases of type 
(b) involve what he thinks are formally identical mental representations 
which characterize opaquely distinct mental states. 
(a) I think I'm sick and you think I'm sick. What's running 
through your head is 'I'm sick'; what's running through your head 
is 'he's sick'. (b) Sam feels faint and Misha knows he does. 
Then what's running through Misha's head may be 'he feels faint.' 
Misha feels faint and Alfred knows he does. Then what's running 
through Alfred's head, too, may be 'he feels faint.' 
These are the obvious results of two mistakes on Fodor's part: an 
assumption that the only way to individuate content is by reference and 
extension, and a confusion between what's in the head with what's running 
though it. He addresses the latter in footnote 8: 
One might try saying: what counts for opaque type 
individuation is what's in your head, not just what's running 
through it. So, for example, though Alfred and Misha are both 
thinking, 'he feels faint,' nevertheless different 
counterfactuals are true of them: Misha would cash his pronoun 
as: 'he, Sam,'whereas Alfred would cash his pronoun as: 'he, 
Misha.' The problem would then be to decide which such 
counterfactuals are relevant, since, if we count all of them, t's 
going to turn out that there are few, if any, cases of distinct organ­
isms having type identical thoughts (321). 
Fodor is wrong to ignore the counterfactuals as unimportant. If we want 
to explain behavior, it is important that we understand the world view of 
the subject, at least as it relates to the context of the situation. This is the 
',,f 
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only way we can come to understand the relations we stand in with our 
mental representations (believing, doubting, etc.). It seems obvious to me 
that distinct organisms will only very rarely have type identical thoughts, 
yet Fodor doesn't want to admit this. There are many cultural and per­
sonal differences in how we see the world, how we 'cut-up' the world, and 
what we find to be relevant to us. The point is that if we really want to 
know what is going on in someone's head to cause a behavioral response, 
you will have to know some of the relevant terms. 
Let me further explain with a Twin Earth example of my own. Bob! 
and his Doppelganger, Bob2, are completely identical as far as their life 
experiences, memories and beliefs. Except, Bob2 recently developed 
a strange case of paranoia and thinks his boss is trying to kill him. The 
bosses' secretaries in the Bobs' respective worlds give the Bobs identical 
notes that their bosses want to see them. Both Bobs will be having the 
thought, 'My boss wants to see me,' but Bob! may also be thinking, 'It's 
time for that big raise,' while Bob2 may also be thinking, 'My boss is 
going to kill me when I get to his office'. It seems that the context in 
which each Bob has their belief will effect greatly the consequence of that 
belief on subsequent beliefs, and therefore the behavioral responses. 
Bob! will go beaming into his boss's office, while Bob2 may have a 
breakdown or go running home. 
What Fodor fails to realize is the importance of context and the 
relations of the current belief to other related beliefs. Fodor is afraid that 
if we have to seek out relevant beliefs, there will be far too many and no 
way of telling which are relevant enough. But being able to type 
individuate a single belief in isolation from all other beliefs, and especially 
from the relevant beliefs, is useless and meaningless. Thought and 
computation are complex dynamic streams of beliefs and calculations. 
For Fodor to look at them in such a simplistic and static way is simply 
unrealistic. Only when thoughts are tied together with other thoughts 
into the complex web of beliefs that is one's world knowledge can we 
begin to understand what is going on 'in the head' 0 cause a behavior. 
And this is what a cognitive psychology should be trying to do. Besides, 
it is 'lbsurd to think that an organism could only have just one thing 'in 
mind' at a given time, remember Miller's "magical number seven." 
As for the problem of deciding which related beliefs are relevant 
enough, this isn't as hopeless as Fodor might think. Certainly the organism 
knows which are relevant to it. The organism is weighing the justification 
of its beliefs and the outcomes from possible behaviors every time it 
makes a decision or exhibits a complex behavior. To understand these re­
lations just is what the organism has 'in mind.' Another route might be to 
define massive parts of the web, or even divide the web into significant 
realms. Who knows what we will find when psychology starts to actually 
study beliefs. 
If we can find the content relations of a belief token in such a way that 
when we find them we c~ come to understand how a subject 'thinks 
about' that mental representation, and how that token stands in relation to 
other tokens, we can come to understand what the subject is really 
thinking about!. We can do this if we construe content in a holistic 
1. Do not confuse this 'about' with anything like reference or extension. 
sense: for any given token of the 
stands in relation to the other tok 
Content is not an external q 
as a consequence of what it ref 
most a token could refer to 0 
"oracles." This is as close as we 
this way, we are no better offtha 
Cartesian demon as well, at leas1 
agree with Fodor that the extern 
Dasein, are out there (maybe) bu 
our beliefs are meaningful intro: 
of the time, and we can only thi 
grasp of content. 
Not only does an organism I 
the only way to explain how the 
mental representations and 1 
introspective capacities of an or 
'things in the world' seems to ba 
our relations to them. There ii 
argue against people which look: 
which one simply keeps asking, 
very quickly that people can't ( 
But I argue that content comes 
token pencil* has content becau 
wooden, * is used for writing, * 
the end, * is on my desk right 
visual and tactile sensations cau 
of these tokens, their content COl 
wooden* has relations like: * is l 
furniture, * is something from a 
and feel caused by wooden* ex}: 
The effectiveness of such 
Anderson's ACT model for tl: 
ACT* is the computer program .. 
about its world is provided 
interconnected in certain relatiOo 
just like those relations betwet; 
appear very tree-like when di 
'intelligent' in that it only speaks 
nonexplicitly stated relations be 
It is a major accomplishment i 
Turing conversation? Probably 
ACT* had sensory inputs, a meal 
to manage its copious incoming 
intelligent indeed. Again, what : 
intelligent, but that a sufficien 
would have to explain a great c 
between the tokens of its mental 
With a holistic account 
completely nontransparently. I 
possibility, he would have ag 
opacity and allowing the researc 
6
Undergraduate Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/rev/vol6/iss1/7
1 8 19
 
the relations we stand in with our 
)ting, etc.). It seems obvious to me 
rarely have type identical thoughts, 
There are many cultural and per­
)rld, how we 'cut-up' the world, and 
le point is that if we really want to 
lead to cause a behavioral response, 
:vant terms. 
in Earth example of my own. Bob I 
pletely identical as far as their life 
Except, Bob2 recently developed 
his boss is trying to kill him. The 
tive worlds give the Bobs identical 
em. Both Bobs will be having the 
lut BobI may also be thinking, 'It's 
may also be thinking, 'My boss is 
ffice'. It seems that the context in 
Ffeet greatly the consequence of that 
lerefore the behavioral responses. 
's office, while Bob2 may have a 
the importance of context and the 
related beliefs. Fodor is afraid that 
i, there will be far too many and no 
enough. But being able to type 
from all other beliefs, and especially 
) and meaningless. Thought and 
treams of beliefs and calculations. 
simplistic and static way is simply 
e tied together with other thoughts 
is one's world knowledge can we 
n 'in the head' 0 cause a behavior. 
gy should be trying to do. Besides, 
l could only have just one thing 'in 
r's "magical number seven." 
~ which related beliefs are relevant 
might think. Certainly the organism 
Irganism is weighing the justification 
n possible behaviors every time it 
x behavior. To understand these re­
in mind.' Another route might be to 
:ven divide the web into significant 
d when psychology starts to actually 
) of a belief token in such a way that 
) understand how a subject 'thinks 
how that token stands in relation to 
erstand what the subject is really 
f we construe content in a holistic 
Ig like reference or extension. 
sense: for any given token of the system, its meaning is a result of how it 
stands in relation to the other tokens in the system. 
Content is not an external quality, whereby a token means something 
as a consequence of what it refers to in an external an sich reality. At 
most a token could refer to only the sensory data coming from our 
"oracles." This is as close as we get to having ideas 'about the world.' In 
this way, we are no better off than SHRDLU, for we may be deceived by a 
Cartesian demon as well, at least we can't tell from the 'inside'. I have to 
agree with Fodor that the external semantic qualities: reference, truth and 
Dasein, are out there (maybe) but we sure can't grasp them. It seems that 
our beliefs are meaningful introspectively and behaviorally at least most 
of the time, and we can only think and act meaningfully if we have some 
grasp of content. 
Not only does an organism have access to holistic content, this seems 
the only way to explain how the organism can grasp the content of its own 
mental representations and the most viable explanation for the 
introspective capacities of an organism. Any knowledge we have about 
'things in the world' seems to based solely on our experience of them and 
our relations to them. There is a pedantic (and very annoying) way to 
argue against people which looks something like an epistemic regress, in 
which one simply keeps asking, "What does __ mean?" One learns 
very quickly that people can't define their terms in a non-circular way. 
But I argue that content comes in just that circular, holistic way. The 
token pencil* has content because it has relations like: * is yellow, * is 
wooden, * is used for writing, * can be sharpened, * little pink eraser on 
the end, * is on my desk right now, and to stored sensory files of the 
visual and tactile sensations caused by pencil* experiences. As for each 
of these tokens, their content comes in part from these same relations, Le. 
wooden* has relations like: * is a quality of pencils, * is a quality of some 
furniture, * is something from a tree, and more sensory files of the look 
and feel caused by wooden* experiences. 
The effectiveness of such a notion has been demonstrated in John 
Anderson's A CT model for the mental representation of knowledge. 
A CT* is the computer program which uses the A CT model. Its knowledge 
about its world is provided by the researcher, its representations 
interconnected in certain relations. The contents of A CT*' s beliefs are 
just like those relations between tokens in the previous example, and 
appear very tree-like when diagrammed. A CT*'s responses are very 
'intelligent' in that it only speaks about what it 'knows' and can draw new, 
nonexplicitly stated relations between indirectly related representations. 
It is a major accomplishment in AI, but what keeps it from passing a 
Turing conversation? Probably only the sophistication and hardware. If 
ACT* had sensory inputs, a means to interact with the world, and a means 
to manage its copious incoming and stored memories, it would seem very 
intelligent indeed. Again, what is important is not what makes computers 
intelligent, but that a sufficient and productive psychology of A CT* 
would have to explain a great deal of these internal semantic relations 
between the tokens of its mental language. 
With a holistic account such as this, content can be construed 
completely nontransparently. I think that if Fodor had considered this 
possibility, he would have agreed. His main concern is preserving 
opacity and allowing the researcher to study only what the organism has 
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'access' to opaquely. Using a holistic account of content is the only way 
to achieve this. It would also seem that if one can define or assign the 
meaning of one or several tokens, one would be able to translate the entire 
mental system, or at least large tracts of it. 
By disallowing the researcher any use of content, the strong 
computationalism of Fodor is like being locked in a Chinese Room 
(Fodor might prefer Mentalese for this example) without any English 
rules. The psychologist has to look for the English rules to answer 
questions in Chinese about stories in Chinese. Imagine trying to rebuild 
the entire Chinese vocabulary and grammatical rules necessary to answer 
any question in Chinese without ever translating a single word to English 
or knowing what a single character means. It would be impossible. Yet 
this is the requirement of strong computationalism. On the other hand, if 
we were to translate a few of the Chinese symbols and words for the 
psychologist, the task is feasible (as evidenced by Chinese-English 
dictionaries). 
What weak computationalism calls for is the "translation" of a few of 
the subject's mental representations into a contentful medium: English or 
approximations of the researcher's mental representations. In so doing, 
one may begin the mammoth task of computational psychology. In 
order to "translate" the first terms, the researcher must use intuition and 
look at causal relations. The idea is that most, or at least some, of our 
mental states will be roughly as we expect them to be. When two people 
look at a tree, it seems reasonable to assume that they are both having 
similar, though certainly not identical, mental states. Only by finding all 
of the relevant relations of an individual's belief state will we find its 
precise content. 
The relativists may argue that no direct translations between languages 
are possible or that beginning with imprecise translations will result in 
the entire system being incorrectly translated. What is important to 
remember is that the translations are only a tentative starting point. When 
the translations are imprecise or incorrect, we will eventually run into 
problems translating the system. When translators first began translating 
Greek, they certainly translated "love" imprecisely. Only after having 
translated enough Greek did they realize there are three different kinds of 
"love" in Greek, and revise their translation. It would seem impossible to 
translate an entire system incorrectly (allowing something like the 
inverted-color spectrum possibilities which seem inconsequential to such a 
project). Any computational psychology will only give us a view into 
what is going on 'in the head'; it will never really tell us what it is like to be 
in the world view of the subject. It may be impossible to translate the 
sensory representations, but we can look at the relations to see how they 
are 'cut-up'; sensory representations also seem prime candidates for 
applying intuitions about causal relations. 
The strong computationalist may argue that the use of imprecise 
definitions is really no different or better than the fudging of the 
naturalists. It is important to remember that the naturalists are only 
fudging because they can't get the precise terms that they need. Their real 
problem is that they are claiming to study the nature of the subjects' 
thoughts as a consequence of he essential character of an external object 
and causal relations between the two. They fail because they don't know 
this character nor do they understand the causal relations. The 
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weak computationalist isn't trying to make any monumental claims based 
on their imprecise definitions. They are merely using these as tools: tools 
to find more definitions and more precise definitions. The weak compu­
tationalist is also going to be far more productive than either the naturalist 
or the strong computationalist, where productivity is all important to 
Fodor. 
Fodor has shown that computationalism is necessary for a cognitive 
psychology. I have demonstrated a need for a more moderate version of 
computationalism than Fodor was willing to provide. I have also 
shown how content can utilized in a nontransparent way. And I have 
answered the objections as to how a weak computationalism can begin, 
and why it doesn't fall into the same Stygian Abyss that claimed natural­
ism. Not only do I think that weak computationalism is the proper way to 
conduct cognitive psychology, but this is the way that it is alrea~y being 
conducted, at least in the fields of knowledge representatIOn and 
linguistics. 
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